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ABSTRACT
Cyber-attacks have become increasingly common and are an
integral part of contemporary armed conflicts. With that premise
in mind, the question arises of whether or not a civilian carrying
out cyber-attacks during an armed conflict becomes a legitimate
target under international humanitarian law. This paper aims to
explore this question using three different analytical and
conceptual frameworks while looking at a variety of cyber-attacks
along with their subsequent effects. One of the core principles of
the law of armed conflict is distinction, which states that civilians
in an armed conflict are granted a set of protections, mainly the
protection from direct attacks by the adversary, whereas
combatants (or members of armed groups) and military objectives
may become legitimate targets of direct attacks. Although
civilians are generally protected from direct attacks, they can still
become victims of an attack because they lose this protection “for
such time as they take direct part in hostilities.”1 In other words,
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1
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.
51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. In the non-international
armed conflict context, see Article 13(3) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
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under certain circumstances, if a civilian decides to engage in
hostile cyber activities (or “hacktivities”), they may well become
a target of a direct lethal attack. I will argue that although the
answer is highly nuanced and context dependent, the most
salutary doctrinal revision that can be made in this area is that
the threshold of harm must adapt to the particular intricacies of
cyberspace.

INTRODUCTION TO TARGETING IN MODERN CONFLICT
In August 2015, a U.S. drone strike in Syria killed Junaid Hussain,
a British hacker who was carrying out hostile cyber activities on behalf of
ISIS.2 Hussain was believed to have a leading position in ISIS’ Cyber
Caliphate, a hacking group that allegedly took control of US Central
Command’s social media accounts. This group published U.S. soldiers’
and officers’ identifying information, such as their full names, addresses,
and photos.3 Unlike other members of ISIS, Hussain only engaged in cyber
activities which, although they were hostile, did not pose the same threat
of imminent danger as the actual use of conventional military force.
Hussain’s death represents the first time a hacker was lethally targeted.
This article predicts that the practice of targeting hackers in the context of
an armed conflict will only increase because cyber-attacks will become a
more frequent and substantial phenomenon in armed conflicts. The crucial
question in this regard is whether individuals like Hussain are legitimate
targets under international humanitarian law (IHL) in armed conflict.
The emergence of cyberspace as an instrument of warfare
exacerbates the gaps and ambiguities that already exist within IHL. A
particularly aggravating factor is the increased involvement of civilians in
cyber-attacks. Civilians in modern armed conflicts can play an active role
when it comes to cyber-attacks, as they serve as private contractors
carrying out both offensive and defensive cyber operations.4 In addition to
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter AP II].
2
Spencer Ackerman, Ewan MacAskill & Alice Ross, Junaid Hussain: British
Hacker for ISIS Believed Killed in US Air Strike, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2015,
12:28 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/27/junaid-hussainbritish-hacker-for-isis-believed-killed-in-us-airstrike.
3
Julia Glum, ISIS Hacker Junaid Hussain Confirmed Dead After US Airstrike on
Islamic State in Syria: Pentagon, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Aug. 28,
2015, 2:52 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-hacker-junaid-hussain-confirmeddead-after-us-airstrike-islamic-state-syria-2073451.
4
See Heather Harrison Dinniss, Cyber Warriors, Patriotic Hackers and the Laws
of War, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW & THE CHANGING TECHNOLOGY
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these private contractors, there are patriotic hackers who make similar
contributions.5 While the traditional notion of an armed conflict includes
members of regular armed forces (“combatants”), this paradigm is no
longer the case on the modern battlefield due to the growing involvement
of civilians in cyber hostilities. As Susan Brenner, a leading expert on
cyber conflict, stated, the “integration of civilians into military efforts can
create uncertainty as to whether someone is acting as a ‘civilian’
(noncombatant) or as a military actor (combatant).”6 After all, it is far
easier to possess a computer with an active internet connection than a
conventional weapon.7 This is because computer technology is readily
accessible and carries a low cost of entry and use.8
In fact, in the aftermath of the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007,
the Estonian government decided to recruit civilian volunteers to serve as
“cyber warriors” should another major cyber-attack on Estonia occur.9
Sean Watts, Professor of Law at Creighton University, explained this
phenomenon of the privatization of cyber operations by describing how
today, many companies provide the expertise required for the development
and employment of computer network attacks.10
The versatility of computers and cyberspace has caused
difficulties for countries that wish to utilize computers militarily, while
retaining their civilian properties. This is sometimes referred to as the
WAR 269 (Dan Saxon ed., 2013) (noting that civilian contractors are
increasingly involved in cyber hostilities).
5
Id.
6
SUSAN BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS, THE EMERGING FAULT LINES OF THE NATION
STATE 197 (2009).
7
See Roger Barnett, A Different Kettle of Fish: Computer Network Attack, 76 J.
INT’L. L. STUD. 1, 22 (2002) (stating that the “entry costs to conduct a strategic
information attack are insignificant” and requite only “an inexpensive computer,
some easily obtainable software, and a simple connection to the Internet.”).
8
See MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE 202 (2014)
(noting that the “low cost and ease of access to technology” allows civilians to
easily conduct cyber operations).
9
David Blair, Estonia Recruits Volunteer Army of ‘Cyber Warriors’, THE
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 26, 2015, 6:58 PM BST), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/europe/estonia/11564163/Estonia-recruits-volunteer-army-of-cyberwarriors.html.
10
See Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VA. J.
INT’L L. 391, 402–03 (2010) (“Reports indicate that few information operations
experts currently serve as active duty soldiers. Many private companies have
employed the skills of those with expertise in the various weapons commonly
used in [Computer Network Attacks].”).
OF
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“dual-use” characteristic of cyberspace.11 Dual-use means that computer
systems and networks may be used for legitimate, benign, civilian
purposes, but at the same time, these systems and networks may be used
by the military, or by civilians, for hostile purposes.12 While this
characteristic is clear to countries, their civilians are often unaware of the
potential consequences of their involvement in cyber operations in armed
conflict, the importance of which may be life or death. Such was the case
with Evgeny Morozov, who participated in the cyber operations against
Georgia in 2008 –
“Not knowing exactly how to sign up for a cyberwar, I started with
an extensive survey of the Russian blogosphere… As I learned from
this blog post, all I needed to do was to save a copy of a certain Web
page to my hard drive and then open it in my browser. In less than an
hour, I had become an Internet soldier. I didn’t receive any calls from
Kremlin operatives; nor did I have to buy a Web server or modify my
computer in any significant way.”13

The problem of civilians who directly participate in hostilities
(DPH) is not particularly new. Yet even today, many find themselves
unable to define the precise boundaries of the notion of DPH. Only in 2009
did the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) publish the
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation of Hostilities
(“Interpretive Guidance”), which attempted to deal with the phenomenon
of civilians who decide to directly participate in hostilities and the legal

See Mary O’Connell, Cyber Security Without Cyber War, 17 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 187, 205 (2012) (comparing cyberspace to other existing treaty
regimes of arms control, noting that “[t]he international community has adopted
treaties in other ‘dual-use’ areas that are analogous to cyber space, such as the
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Both
of these treaties seek to end any use or even possession of chemical or nuclear
weapons while at the same time promoting legitimate non-military uses of
chemicals and nuclear power”).
12
See Kai Ambos, International Criminal Responsibility in Cyberspace, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 118, 131
(Tsagourias & Buchan eds., 2015) (explaining that the “interconnectivity between
civilian and military purposes” of cyberspace complicates the principle of
distinction between civilians and combatants).
13
Evgeny Morozov, An Army of Ones and Zeroes: How I Became a Soldier in the
Georgia-Russia Cyberwar, SLATE (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.slate.com/
articles/technology/technology/2008/08/an_army_of_ones_and_zeroes.html.
11
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and practical ramifications of such a decision.14 The main consequences
of such participation are the forfeiture of civilian protections and the
legitimization of lethal targeting against civilians who DPH. The
Interpretive Guidance does not directly deal with the issues raised by cyber
warfare, but it does provide the general paradigm for civilians who DPH.
Additional attempts to address cyberspace and armed conflict are
reflected in the 2013 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Warfare (“Tallinn Manual”), a NATO sponsored non-binding
codification of the international legal norms applicable to the wartime use
of cyber-attacks.15 This document specifically deals with cyber warfare
(as opposed to the more general Interpretive Guidance by the ICRC), but
it is not legally binding.16 The recent Law of War Manual by the U.S.
Department of Defense addresses the notion of DPH, but does not
sufficiently elaborate on its connection to cyberspace.17
This paper argues that the boundary between legitimate activity in
cyberspace during armed conflict (or, participation in war efforts) and
hostile activities, which constitute DPH, is unclear. This resulting
ambiguity has operational consequences, such as the inability to determine
whether a specific individual is targetable in as a result of his or her actions
in cyberspace.18 Furthermore, this paper argues that cyber activities by
NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE].
15
See generally TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN
MANUAL], https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html (discussing the legal issues
14

surrounding cyberwarfare).
16
Id. at 5.
17
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 222–27 (2015)
[hereinafter LAW OF WAR MANUAL], http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/
Documents/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf (discussing generally the
complexities of civilian actions in hostilities but missing an elaboration on civilian
hacking activities).
18
This unclear boundary between direct participation in hostilities and
participation in war efforts was already controversial and highly debated at the
conclusion of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, as
provided in the INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949 at 619 (Yves Sandos et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC
COMMENTARY
ON
APS],
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/
Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf (“There should be a clear distinction between
direct participation in hostilities and participation in the war effort. The latter is
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civilians belonging to the opposing party of an armed conflict should meet
a certain threshold in order to be considered DPH. Although the “threshold
of harm” requirement is the first prerequisite under the DPH paradigm, it
is unclear what activities in cyberspace reach this threshold, as cyberspace
challenges the notions of physicality, political borders, and state monopoly
on force. This paper argues that the DPH framework may have to be more
responsive to the myriad harms that emanate from cyberspace activities.

I. CIVILIANS AND THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN
HOSTILITIES
International humanitarian law is a specific branch of international
law that regulates and limits conduct in times of armed conflict.19 It is a
set of principles and norms codified in treaties, such as the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols from 1977, and
customary international law.20 The key purpose of IHL is its attempt to
minimize the adverse effects associated with war, particularly the effects
on uninvolved individuals and collectives, namely civilians.21
Determining whether an individual is a civilian or not (based on
his or her status, rather than acts) is a separate and complicated issue.
Article 50 of Additional Protocol I defines a civilian as “any person who
does not belong to one of the categories of the persons referred to in Article

often required from the population as a whole to various degrees. Without such a
distinction the efforts made to reaffirm and develop international humanitarian
law could become meaningless. In fact, in modern conflicts, many activities of
the nation contribute to the conduct of hostilities, directly or indirectly; even the
morale of the population plays a role in this context.”).
19
See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law: Answers
to Your Questions (2002), http://www.redcross.org/images/MEDIA_Custom
ProductCatalog/m22303661_IHL-FAQ.pdf (“The purpose of international
humanitarian law is to limit the suffering caused by war by protecting and
assisting its victims as far as possible.”).
20
See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/sicj/icj_statute_e.pdf
(stating that international custom, also known as customary international law, is
“general practice accepted as law”).
21
See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 115 (2004) (“The first and foremost inference
from the basic rule is that direct—and deliberate—attacks against civilians are
forbidden.”).
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4A (1) (2), (3) and (6).”22Where there is doubt, a person should be
presumed a civilian.”23 Although this definition helps in understanding
who qualifies as a civilian, it does not provide any guidance as to whether
a civilian is DPH.
One of the fundamental principles of IHL is distinction, which
provides that an attack should distinguish between civilians and
combatants, and between civilian and military objectives.24 Distinction
predates modern IHL, and has been part of the law of wars jurisprudence
for centuries – “Slaughter of men armed and resisting is the law of war…
it is reasonable that they who have taken arms should be punished in battle,
but that Non-combatants are not to be hurt.”25 The principle of distinction
is comprised of various specific obligations. First, civilians can never be
the object of direct attacks by a party to an armed conflict.26 That is,
22

Article 4(A) (1), (2), (3), and (6) of the Third Geneva Convention (Convention
(III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949),
reads:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party
to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps,
including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following
conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
(c)
that
of
carrying
arms
openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
23
AP I, supra note 1, art. 50(1).
24
AP I, supra note 1, arts. 51–52.
25
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 216 (William Whewell
trans., London, John W. Parker 1853) (1625) (emphasis in original).
26
AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(2).
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adversaries are prohibited from aiming their weapons at civilians or
civilian objects. Additionally, acts of violence, which are primarily
intended to terrorize the civilian population, are prohibited.27 Second,
attacks which cannot sufficiently discriminate between civilians and
combatants are prohibited.28 Third, any attack resulting in collateral
damage in the form of civilian casualties, injuries, and damage to civilian
objects should be proportionate to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated from such an attack29 (colloquially referred to as
“proportionality” and considered a distinct, fundamental principle of
IHL).30
These broad civilian protections (also referred to as “noncombatant immunity”31) come with a specific exception. Namely,
civilians only enjoy these protections “unless and for such time as they
take a direct part in hostilities.”32 This exception represents the core
principle that uninvolved civilians are protected from direct attacks, but,
once they participate, they forfeit their civilian protections and become
viable targets under IHL.33 Although the exception appears in Additional
Protocols, it represents customary international law and is binding upon
all states regardless of ratification status.34
The commentary to Additional Protocol I defines direct
participation in hostilities as “acts of war which are intended by their

27

Id.
AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(4).
29
AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(1)(b).
30
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 46–50 (2005),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-internationalhumanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf (rule 14).
31
See, e.g., JUDITH GARDAM, NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY AS A NORM OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 116 (1993) (noting that the prevention of
indiscriminate attacks on civilians is “the general rule of noncombatant
immunity” in international humanitarian law).
32
AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(3); AP II, supra note 1, art. 13(3).
33
See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in
Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697, 702
(2010) (stating that “international humanitarian law suspends . . . civilian
protections” when civilians directly participate in hostilities).
34
See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Israel 62(1) PD
507
(2006)
(Isr.),
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/
02007690.a34.pdf, ¶ 12 (noting that the exception to civilian protections “reflects
a customary rule of international law” and thus binds all states).
28
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nature or their purpose to hit specifically the personnel and the matériel35
of the armed forces of the adverse Party.”36 It is highly significant that the
temporal scope of the targetability of civilians engaged in DPH remains
unclear and continues to generate considerable controversy.37 Moreover,
civilians who DPH are not granted immunity from prosecution under
domestic criminal law for their activities in the hostilities, as the immunity
is associated with combatants who belong to recognized armed forces.38
However, civilians engaging in DPH who are captured while committing
their hostile activities are granted certain minimal protections under
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I39 or Common Article 3,40 depending
on the classification of the armed conflict.41
In this context, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance provides a
framework to address the phenomenon of civilians who DPH.42 Although
the Interpretive Guidance has garnered approval and is generally well
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 835 (11th ed. 2004) (defining “matériel”
as “equipment and supplies used by soldiers”)
36
ICRC COMMENTARY ON APS, supra note 18, at 516.
37
Id. at 1453 (“If a civilian participates directly in hostilities, it is clear that he
will not enjoy any protection against attacks for as long as his participation lasts.
Thereafter, as he no longer presents any danger for the adversary, he may not be
attacked; moreover, in case of doubt regarding the status of an individual, he is
presumed to be a civilian. Anyone suspected of having taken part in hostilities and
deprived of his liberty for this reason will have the benefit of the provisions laid
down in Articles 4 (Fundamental guarantees), 5 (Persons whose liberty has been
restricted), and 6 (Penal prosecutions).”).
38
See Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged
Belligerents, and the Struggle over Legitimacy, HARV. PROGRAM ON
HUMANITARIAN POL’Y & CONFLICT RES. OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, No. 2,
Winter 2005, at 12–13 (noting that combatants “have a special status . . . [which
includes] the right to participate in hostilities and receive immunity from
prosecution . . . for killing carried out in accordance with the law.”).
39
AP I, supra note 1, art. 75 (international armed conflict).
40
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 3]. In
non-international armed conflict, such detainees would be granted humane
treatment, and Common Article 3 would apply, along with customary
international law and human rights law, where a gap exists.
41
See THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 44, 49 (Dieter
Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013) (stating that “[a]n international armed conflict exists if one
state uses armed force against another state” and that “[a] non-international armed
conflict is a situation of protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state”).
42
See generally INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14.
35
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received in academic and legal-military communities, it only represents
the institutional view of the ICRC.43 Due to the lack of precedential law
regarding DPH and the reputation of the ICRC as having expertise in IHL,
the Interpretive Guidance is often the only framework used to determine
whether or not a civilian is engaging in DPH.44 The conclusions of the
Interpretive Guidance are sometimes controversial and highly contested,
and there is substantial criticism of these determinations from both
military and academic perspectives.45
The core of the DPH paradigm as provided by the Interpretive
Guidance lies in three criteria that are required in order for an individual
to be considered a civilian engaged in DPH.46 First, a certain threshold of
harm needs to be met.47 Second, there needs to be a direct causal link
between the act in question and the harm caused.48 Third, the act needs to
be designed to cause harm in support of one party to the conflict and to the
detriment of the opposing party of the conflict (also known as a
“belligerent nexus”).49

A. Threshold of Harm
Not every hostile action by civilians will reach the threshold
required for the DPH label. The Interpretive Guidance requires that the act
in question reach a certain severity threshold in relation to the harm caused
(or likely to be caused) in order for that individual to forfeit his civilian
status.50 The Interpretive Guidance provides two tests for determining
whether the threshold of harm has been reached. First, an act must be likely
to adversely affect the military operations or capacity of a party to the

See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 9 (stating that “the 10
recommendations made by the Interpretive Guidance, as well as the
accompanying commentary, do not endeavour to change binding rules of
customary or treaty IHL, but reflect the ICRC’s institutional position as to how
existing IHL should be interpreted”).
44
See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 33.
45
See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian
Law: An Introduction to the Forum, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 637 (2010).
46
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 46.
47
Id. at 48.
48
Id. at 51.
49
Id. at 58.
50
Id. at 47 (“The qualification of an act as direct participation does not require the
materialization of harm reaching the threshold but merely the objective likelihood
that the act will result in such harm”).
43
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armed conflict.51 Second, an act must be likely to inflict death, injury, or
destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack.52 The
likelihood standard is evaluated objectively in each case.53
While the threshold of likelihood of “death, injury or destruction
on persons or objects” is quite straightforward, the threshold of the
likelihood to “adversely affect the military capacity or capacity of a party
to the armed conflict” is somewhat obscure. An act that could result in
death, injury or destruction has the same consequences as an act that is
likely to affect military capacity or capacity of a party to the armed
conflict. In other words, in both cases, the civilian who carries out the
hostile act would be targetable, should he satisfy the remaining two
requirements. In Targeted Killings, the Israeli Supreme Court suggested
that “acts which by nature and objective are intended to cause damage to
civilians” be part of the threshold of harm requirement, however that
requirement may already be included in the “death, injury or
destruction.”54
Currently, it is unlikely that a cyber-attack will be objectively
likely to cause death, injury, or destruction, although it might be possible
with destructive cyber-attacks against critical cyber infrastructure, such as
hospitals and power plants.55 Conversely, cyber-attacks can be highly
disruptive and substantially affect military capacity.56 However, it is
debatable whether a particular cyber-attack actually affects military
capacity or simply represents a form of expression, propaganda, or mild
nuisance. The Interpretive Guidance excluded “manipulation of computer
networks” from the application of the DPH framework, even though such
acts might “have a serious impact on public security, health and

51

Id. at 46.
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 47.
53
Id.
54
HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Israel 62(1) PD 507
(2006)
(Isr.),
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/
02007690.a34.pdf, ¶ 33.
55
See, e.g., Scott A. Newton, Can Cyberterrorists Actually Kill People?, SANS
INST. INFOSEC READING ROOM (2002), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/
whitepapers/warfare/cyberterrorists-kill-people-820.
56
See Shane Quinlan, Jam. Bomb. Hack? U.S. Cyber Capabilities and the
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, GEO. SECURITY STUD. REV. (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/04/07/jam-bomb-hack-new-us-cyber-capabilities-and-the-suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses/
(explaining
how Israel bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor and managed to avoid detection by
the aerial defense systems using a cyber-attack).
52
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commerce.”57 The Interpretive Guidance briefly addressed the possibility
of cyber-attacks affecting military capacity by providing that “electronic
interference with military computer networks could also suffice, whether
through computer network attacks (CNA) or computer network
exploitations (CNE), as well as wiretapping the adversary’s high
command or transmitting tactical targeting information for an attack.”58

B. Direct Causal Link
The second requirement of the DPH framework is that the act in
question directly causes the harm.59 In a modern society, the activities and
occupations that civilians pursue could contribute to the military defeat of
an adversary. Examples include attacking weapons production,
construction, political propaganda, production of goods, and the supply of
electricity and fuel.60 However, even though these activities could
ultimately result in severe harm, reaching the threshold of harm as set in
the first requirement, they may not satisfy the second requirement of a
direct causal link.61 Therefore, civilians who contribute to war efforts in
such indirect ways would not be directly participating in hostilities and
their protected civilian status would remain intact.62
The prevailing test to determine causation is determining whether
the harm caused is only one causal step away from the act.63 Therefore, all
the capacity building, services, and production activities are far removed
in the causal chain and will not be considered as direct causal acts.
However, the Interpretive Guidance argues that acts that in isolation do
not cause harm, when done in conjunction with other acts that cause the
57

INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 50.
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 48 & n.101 (“CNA have been
tentatively defined as ‘operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computer and networks
themselves’ and may be conducted over long distances through radio waves or
international communication networks. While they may not involve direct
physical damage, the resulting system malfunctions can be devastating. CNE,
namely ‘the ability to gain access to information hosted on information systems
and the ability to make use of the system itself,’ though not of a direct destructive
nature, could have equally significant military implications. During the expert
meetings, CNA causing military harm to the adversary in a situation of armed
conflict were clearly regarded as part of the hostilities.”) (citations omitted).
59
Id. at 52
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
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required threshold of harm, will be seen as direct causation acts (for
example – transmission of intelligence, instructing and assisting troops in
executing military operations, etc.).64
An important point that also relates to cyber-attacks is the
distinction between causal proximity and temporal or geographic
proximity.65 The fact that a certain hostile act is delayed or distant does
not necessarily affect the causality of that act. An example of both a
delayed and distant hostile act might be a cyber-attack carried out by State
A against State B over international borders. State A collects military
intelligence during the attack, and the harm from the attack materializes
after a certain period of time. Although the cyber-attack was initiated by
one nation-state and materially affected a state thousands of miles away
after time had elapsed (i.e. no temporal or geographical proximity), it is
nonetheless clear that there is causal proximity between the cyber-attack
and the harm. In this case, the adverse effect is on the military operations
of State B against State A.
Additionally, the effects of most cyber operations might be
secondary or tertiary in nature, further complicating the direct causation
requirement.66 Particularly challenging are cyber operations that cause
effects in multiple causal steps. This is especially the case with unaware
actors being involved in the form of intermediate, compromised computer

64

Id. at 55.
Id.
66
See TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION
AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 127 (William A. Owens, Kenneth W.
Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2009) (“One of the most difficult-to-handle aspects
of a cyberattack is that in contrast to a kinetic attack that is almost always intended
to destroy a physical target, the desired effects of a cyberattack are almost always
indirect, which means that what are normally secondary effects are in fact of
central importance. In general, the planner must develop chains of causality—do
X, and Y happens, which causes Z to happen, which in turn causes A to happen.
Also, many of the intervening events between initial cause and ultimate effect are
human reactions (e.g., in response to an attack that does X, the [target] network
administrator will likely respond in way Y, which means that Z—which may be
preplanned—must take response Y into account). Moreover, the links in the causal
chain may not all be of similar character—they may involve computer actions and
results, or human perceptions and decisions, all of which combine into some
outcome.”).
65
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systems and networks.67 In cases like this, the direct causation requirement
might be the hardest to satisfy in the cyber operation context.68

C. Belligerent Nexus
The belligerent nexus requirement is the third and last condition
for a civilian to be considered a DPH. It requires that the hostile act in
question is specifically designed to cause the required threshold of harm
and is specifically designed to do so in support of one party to the armed
conflict at the detriment of the opposing party.69 This requirement serves
two functions. First, it targets acts that happen in the context of an armed
conflict with the purpose of empowering one party over the other. Second,
it ignores acts that happen regardless of an ongoing armed conflict, even
though the harm caused could reach the required threshold and the harm
was directly caused by the act. Thus, when hostile actions are not related
to the armed conflict, the civilian is not a DPH and the appropriate
punishment will come from normal law enforcement. In other words, the
act is not fulfilling the belligerent nexus requirement.70 The Interpretive
Guidance provides that the determination of whether a belligerent nexus
exists in relation to a specific act–
must be based on the information reasonably available to the person
called on to make the determination, but they must always be deduced
from objectively verifiable factors. In practice, the decisive question
should be whether the conduct of a civilian, in conjunction with the
circumstances prevailing at the relevant time and place, can
reasonably be perceived as an act designed to support one party to the
conflict by directly causing the required threshold of harm to another
party.71

Cyber-attacks happen on a daily basis, both inside and outside of
armed conflict. Therefore, the belligerent nexus requirement can be
challenging to establish should a cyber-attack occur in an armed conflict
context. Such cyber-attacks might fulfill the threshold of harm and direct

67

See David Turns, Cyber Warfare and the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities, 17 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 279, 288 (2012).
68
Id. at 296; see also Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Cyber Warriors and the Jus in
Bello, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 288, 298 (2013) (“The ‘direct causation’ requirement
appears easier to meet in the context of cyber operations than in traditional kinetic
operations.”).
69
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 58.
70
Id. at 64.
71
Id. at 63–64.
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causation requirements, yet the determination that the cyber-attack meets
the belligerent nexus requirement may be attenuated.

D. The Notion of “Continuous Combat Function”
The notion of continuous combat function (CCF) is an essential
supplement to the three requirements associated with the DPH
framework.72 It is generally believed that the DPH status is temporal, that
is, it only applies to civilians for such time as they take direct part in
hostilities,73 so civilians who carry out hostile acts sporadically,
spontaneously, or on an unorganized basis are targetable only while they
are actively carrying out these acts.74 However, there is an assumption that
when a civilian assumes an integral role in an organized armed group and
whose “continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or
command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in
hostilities,” the civilian is CCF.75 According to the principle of CCF, such
a civilian would be targetable even if he or she is not carrying out hostile
acts at the moment of the targeting. In other words, a civilian who is CCF
is targetable due to his or her status, which materialized as a result of his
or her continuous and persistent actions. In contrast, a DPH civilian is
targetable only for such time as he carries out his or her hostile acts. This
means that:
civilians lose protection against direct attack for the duration of each
specific act amounting to direct participation in hostilities, whereas
members of organized armed groups belonging to a non-state party
to an armed conflict cease to be civilians, and lose protection against
direct attack for as long as they assume their continuous combat
function.76

Thus, a hacker who carries out cyber-attacks in an armed conflict
continuously and assumes membership in an organized armed group that
is a party to the armed conflict would be considered a civilian with CCF.
Consequently, this hacker is targetable at all times, as long as the CCF
label remains.

II. BETWEEN INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND DOMESTIC – THE TALLINN
MANUAL AND THE U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL
The Interpretive Guidance represents the institutional view of the
ICRC regarding the international humanitarian law applicable to the
72

Id. at 33.
AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(3).
74
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 34.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 70.
73
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notion of DPH. While it is an authoritative and compelling document, it
does not represent binding international law. There are more concrete
implementations of DPH in the intergovernmental context, such as The
Tallinn Manual, and in the domestic context, the U.S. Law of War Manual.
Thus, it is useful to analyze the Tallinn Manual and U.S. Law as they have
slightly differing views on the notion of DPH as it applies to cyber-attacks.

A. The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to
Cyber Warfare
The Tallinn Manual is an initiative of the NATO Cooperative
Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, based in Tallinn, Estonia. The
Tallinn Manual was published in 2012, and it is a non-binding set of rules,
based on the rules pertaining to the use of force (in the UN Charter sense)
and IHL. It was unanimously agreed upon by the group of experts assigned
to draft the Tallinn Manual. The Tallinn Manual consists of black letter
rules and a commentary for each rule presented. According to the Manual,
the rules reflect lex lata (existing law) and not lex ferenda (the law that
should be).77
Rule 35 of the Tallinn Manual, which is precisely the same as
Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13(3) of Additional
Protocol II, reads “civilians enjoy protection against attack unless and for
such time as they directly participate in hostilities.”78 The commentary that
accompanies this rule sets forth some of the differences between the
Interpretive Guidance and the Tallinn Manual.
With regard to the threshold of harm, while the Interpretive
Guidance requires the materialization of harm or if harm did not
materialize, the objective likelihood standard, the Tallinn Manual uses the
term “intended or actual effect.”79 In other words, objective likelihood is
not required for the threshold of harm requirement, but instead actual harm
or individual intent to cause that harm is used. This is a lower standard
than the one suggested by the Interpretive Guidance. Therefore, a civilian
with intent to cause sufficient harm, who carries out a sloppy cyber-attack
with no chance of affecting the targeted adversary, will still lose his
protection from direct attack since the cyber-attack would still be seen as

77

See Ido Kilovaty, Cyber Warfare and the Jus ad Bellum Challenges: Evaluation
in the Light of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare, 5 AM. U. NAT’L. SECURITY L. BRIEF, no. 1, 2014, at 91, 96.
78
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 15, at 118 (rule 35).
79
Id. at 119 (rule 35, cmt. 4) (emphasis added).
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DPH under the Tallinn Manual approach.80 Such civilians who might not
be the savviest hackers, might be more easily targeted due to the failure of
their cyber operation.
The Tallinn Manual applies the intent standard to the second
requirement of direct causation as well. It requires a “direct causal link
between the act in question and the harm intended or inflicted.”81
The Tallinn Manual also describes the third requirement of
belligerent nexus as “acts [that] must be directly related to the
hostilities.”82 At first glance, it is a more expansive approach than the one
suggested by the Interpretive Guidance. However, the footnote to that
requirement is a reference to the Interpretive Guidance definition of “an
act [that] must be specifically designed to directly cause the required
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment
of another.”83 This suggests that the Tallinn Manual is actually in line with
the Interpretive Guidance, and thus, this paper tends to disagree with the
view that the Tallinn Manual’s perspective of belligerent nexus is more
expansive than the one in the Interpretive Guidance.84

B. U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual
The recent U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual
represents, to some extent, a set of rules to govern the conduct of hostilities
in armed conflicts. In a sense, it suggests desirable norms for cyber warfare
as far as the U.S. is concerned.85 Although, naturally, the Law of War
Manual binds the U.S. alone, its understanding of the DPH framework in
cyberspace is analyzed in this section in an attempt to compare that
understanding to the DPH norms advanced by the ICRC and NATO.
Rule 16.5.5 of the Law of War Manual entitled “Use of Civilian
Personnel to Support Cyber Operations” provides that States are not
prohibited under the law of war to employ civilian personnel to carry out
cyber operations.86 This proposition, according to the Manual, is also true
if the cyber operation amounts to DPH.87 Later in this Rule, the Manual
80

See Collin Allan, Note, Direct Participation in Hostilities from Cyberspace, 54
VA. J. INT’L. L. 173, 182 (2013).
81
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 15, at 119 (rule 35 cmt. 4).
82
Id.
83
Id. at 119–20 n.65.
84
See Allan, supra note 75, at 189.
85
See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, at 1007.
86
Id.
87
Id.
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provides that “Civilians who take a direct part in [cyber] hostilities forfeit
protection from being made the object of attack.”88 However, the Manual
does not give any guidance as to the notion of direct participation in cyber
hostilities. Nonetheless, there is a separate chapter dealing with direct
participation in non-cyber hostilities.89
Interestingly, the Manual clarifies that the United States did not
adopt the definition of direct participation in hostilities as provided by
Additional Protocol I90 or the ICRC Interpretive Guidance.91 Although
this is the case, the Manual agrees that certain parts of the Interpretive
Guidance are reflective of customary international law, while other parts
are not.92 The general DPH framework, which the Manual suggests is a
departure from the three-tiered structure, was adopted by both the
Interpretive Guidance and the Tallinn Manual.93
First, the Manual focuses on the threshold requirement, by
requiring either “proximate or “but for” cause of death, injury, or damage
to persons or objects” or an adverse effect on military operations or
capacity.94 Already in the description of the required harm, the Manual
sets the standard of causation by demanding “proximate or “but for”
cause.”95 The causation test provided by the Manual is somewhat looser
than the one advanced by the Interpretive Guidance, since it could be
satisfied with proximity and could apply to a broader set of cyber
operations.
Second, the Manual sets forth the grounds for the belligerent
nexus requirement, providing that hostile acts should be evaluated by the
degree to which they are connected to military operations or by “the
degree to which the act is temporally or geographically near the
fighting.”96 The first condition is somewhat similar to the ICRC’s
88

Id. at 1008.
See id. (describing rule 5.9).
90
Id. at 222
91
See Stephen Pomper, Toward a Limited Consensus on the Loss of Civilian
Immunity in Non-International Armed Conflict: Making Progress Through
Practice, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 181, 186 (2012) (“From the operational perspective,
the feedback [on the ICRC’s INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE] was that the report was
too rigid and complex, and did not give an accurate picture of State practice or (in
some respects) of a practice to which States could realistically aspire.”).
92
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, at 223.
93
See id. at 226–27 (discussing the full structure of the LAW OF WAR MANUAL).
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Id. at 226.
95
Id.
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Id.
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belligerent nexus interpretation. However, the broader term “military
operations” is used in place of hostilities. Moreover, the condition of
temporal and geographical proximity is again a departure from how
belligerent nexus is generally understood, and in any case, represents a
complication to cyber hostilities that might be temporally and
geographically distant from the fighting.97 The following consideration
put forth by the Manual is actually closer to the Interpretive Guidance
understanding of the belligerent nexus requirement, although the state of
mind required is slightly different. The Manual requires that the act be
“intended to advance the war aims of one party to the conflict to the
detriment of the opposing party.”98 However, the Interpretive Guidance
requires an act that is “specifically designed to directly cause the required
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment
of another.”99 Therefore, the Manual provides a standard that is lower and
only requires intent, as opposed to the more objective standard of specific
design.
Third, the Manual sets forth the military significance
consideration, which focuses on the degree of contribution of the hostile
act to the military action against the opposing party. It seeks to determine
whether the value of contribution of the hostile act is comparable or greater
than the more common DPH acts, or whether the hostile act poses
significant risk to the targeted party.100 These considerations are not part
of the Interpretive Guidance or Tallinn Manuals’ frameworks. However,
it is reasonable to find them in a military manual, which provides a more
specified set of considerations to support military operations.
Fourth, the Manual suggests evaluating whether the act is
traditionally military, that is, whether the hostile act is performed
traditionally by military forces (such as “combat, combat support, and
combat service support functions”101) or whether there is a decisionmaking process as to the use or application of combat power.102 However,
it is unclear how this consideration could be applied to cyber-attacks, since
cyber-attacks represent an emerging phenomenon that cannot at this point
qualify as traditional, and there is insufficient data pertaining to the
military application of cyberspace capabilities in times of armed conflict.
It is critical to understand that the aforementioned factors are
considerations according to the Manual, and they provide some guidance
97
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for evaluation of whether a specific hostile act qualifies as DPH. However,
the factors differ fundamentally from the views presented by the
Interpretive Guidance and the Tallinn Manual, which have three basic
requirements to be fulfilled in order for a civilian to qualify as a direct
participant in hostilities.

III. DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN ‘HACKTIVITIES’ – SHORTCOMINGS
Cyber-attacks in modern armed conflicts are only one factor that
exacerbates the gaps and ambiguities within the DPH framework. As
demonstrated in earlier sections, the DPH framework can be
indeterminate, and there is a deep and fundamental disagreement as to the
interpretation and application of critical points within the DPH analysis.
These shortcomings will be discussed and analyzed in this section, with a
focus on the difficulty regarding the characterization of a hostile cyber act
as DPH and the temporal scope challenge.

A. Boundaries of the Harm Threshold Cyber Activities
The DPH threshold requirements are particularly opaque and
amorphous in the context of cyber operations. Nevertheless, they contain
at their core certain general notions that may be helpful in relation to
certain cyber operations. Specific examples of such cyber operations exist,
and they will be discussed in detail in the following sub-section.
1. Passive v. Active Cyber Defenses
The DPH framework is inadequate when it comes to cyber
operations intended to enhance the cyber defense of one party, while not
directly targeting the opposing party to the armed conflict.103 Moreover,
when a cyber operation only incidentally affects military operations of the
opposing party, or when there is no direct causal link, the only possible
conclusion is that such activity would not qualify as DPH. However,
certain authors believe that the DPH framework applies to such acts.104
The Tallinn Manual explicitly addressed passive cyber defense by
providing that “[s]ome members of the International Group of Experts
took the position that acts that enhance one’s own military capacity are
included, as they necessarily weaken an adversary’s relative position. An
example is maintaining passive cyber defenses of military cyber
assets.”105 However, before analyzing the position of the Tallinn Manual,
it is essential to define active as opposed to passive cyber defenses, as
often the two concepts are conflated.

103
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Jeffrey Carr, in his landmark book “Inside Cyber Warfare,”
defined active cyber defenses as
…electronic countermeasures designed to strike attacking computer
systems and shut down cyber attacks midstream. Security
professionals can set up active defenses to automatically respond to
attacks against critical systems, or they can carry them out manually.
For the most part, active defenses are classified, though programs that
send destructive viruses back to the perpetrator’s machine or packetflood the intruder’s machine have entered the public domain.106

According to Carr’s definition, active cyber defenses can be
manual, meaning that professionals carry them out as needed in response
to actual or anticipated cyber-attacks, or automatic, meaning that the
targeted computer system is set to respond using certain cyber measures if
a cyber-attack occurs.107
Carr goes on to define passive defenses by limiting them to

“traditional forms of computer security used to defend computer networks,
such as system access controls, data access controls, security
administration, and secure system design.”108 The focus in passive cyber
defenses is that there is no hawkish response to cyber-attacks, but there are
defensive layers resident in the computer systems that are meant to restrict
or at least make it harder to access and manipulate the computer system.109
According to this analysis, it seems that if civilians are engaged in
active cyber defense measures, such as actually countering cyber-attacks
that reach the threshold of harm, they would be considered directly
participating in hostilities. In contrast, if civilians are only involved in
passive cyber defense measures, such as installing anti-virus software,
encrypting critical data and securing the system, they would fulfill neither
the direct causal link requirement nor the requisite threshold of harm.110
106

JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 46 (2nd ed. 2011).
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See Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to
Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defense Against States Who
Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009); see also Oona
Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817, 858 (2012)
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The Law of War Manual recognizes that some civilians might be
authorized to support cyber operations, and it provides that “[a]s with noncyber operations, the law of war does not prohibit States from using
civilian personnel to support their cyber operations.”111 However, the Law
of War Manual itself does not make the distinction between support that
constitutes DPH and support that does not.112
The Tallinn Manual defines “passive cyber defense” as “a
measure for detecting and mitigating cyber intrusions and the effects of
cyber attacks that does not involve launching a preventive, pre-emptive or
countering operation against the source. Examples of passive cyber
defense measures are firewalls, patches, anti-virus software, and digital
forensic tools.”113 Even given this definition, the Tallinn Manual
concludes that such measures would qualify as DPH if carried out by
civilians.114 This assertion, following the analysis provided in this section,
is counterintuitive, and interestingly, Michael Schmitt himself (the
General Editor of the Tallinn Manual) was less confident about that
assertion. In a recent article, he asked, “Is passive cyber defense of enemy
systems an act of direct participation such that contractors who perform
the task lose their immunity from attack?”115 The fact that passive cyber
defenses alone are becoming less efficient than active cyber defenses will
increase the involvement of civilians in active defensive cyber operations
and might expose them to the risk of being labeled as DPH.116 The

employed to generally maintain computer networks for an armed force (in the
capacity of general IT services such as email, websites, etc.) would likely not be
considered as taking direct part in hostilities, any employee or contractor who was
specifically employed to conduct hostile CNA/CNE would, in theory, be
considered as taking direct part in hostilities.”).
111
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115
Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Wattset, The Decline of International
Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber Warfare, 50 TEX. INT’L.
L.J. 189, 228 (2015).
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See Pascal Brangetto, Tomáš Minárik & Jan Stinissen, From Active Cyber
Defence to Responsive Cyber Defence: A Way for State to Defend Themselves –
Legal Implications, NATO LEGAL GAZETTE, Dec. 2014, at 16–17 (“The mere fact
of labelling current defensive tools as passive is a call for a more empowering
definition of cyber defence. The use of only passive measures is no longer
sufficient to protect networks in the face of rising threat levels. As a way to
overcome this, and to be able to hold the high ground, a concept was developed
to enable the defending party to play an active part in its own cyber defence.”)
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recommended approach is to distinguish between acts designed to enhance
“general capacity to carry out unspecified hostile acts” and acts that are
“aimed to carry out a specific hostile act.”117
2. Data Destruction and Alternation
Cyber operations carried out by civilians that directly alter
military data required for upcoming military operations will most likely
qualify as adversely affecting military operations. According to some,
such cyber operations would be equivalent to cyber operations that directly
disrupt unmanned aerial vehicle systems, as well as radars and weapons
that are operated by computer systems.118
While destruction of sensitive military data that directly and
adversely affects military operations is a clear-cut case of direct
participation in hostilities, there are far more difficult cases of data
destruction such as destruction of medical data belonging to certain
individuals.119 The immediate question then is whether such destruction
would qualify as “destruction to objects” under the threshold of harm
requirement.120
The Interpretive Guidance excludes “manipulation of computer
networks” from the application of the DPH framework,121 while the
117

INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 66; see also Allan, supra note 80,
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Tallinn Manual does not explicitly address destruction and alteration of
data in the sense of DPH. By analogy to Tallinn Manual’s definition of
“Cyber Attack”122 it can be inferred that the Tallinn Manual sees the
destruction of data as a cyber-attack only if it results in physical effects,
such as “injury or death of individuals or damage or destruction to physical
objects.”123 Such an approach fails to acknowledge the importance of data
in a modern, interconnected, and cyber-reliant society. An example
demonstrating the inadequacy of this approach compares a cyber operation
resulting in the complete deletion of data belonging to an entire State’s
banking system with the physical destruction of a single data center. The
data deletion is absent of injury, death or physical damage, would not
qualify as a “cyber-attack,” and would unlikely be considered as DPH,
whereas the destruction of a data center would fall under the “death, injury
or destruction to objects” and would be considered as DPH.124
This paper’s key recommendation is to overcome the obsolete
confines of physicality and to understand that in today’s world, data can
be just as crucial to the overall wellbeing of a society as other physical
objects. In discussing whether civilian data should be defined as an
“object” under IHL, thereby prohibiting attacks on civilian data because
such attack would be a violation of the prohibition on direct attacks against
civilians and civilian objects,125 Michael Schmitt observed that while there
is no definitive answer to the question, “data should not be characterized
as an object in itself.”126 Even though not all targeted data would lead to
severe consequences, some targeted data would nonetheless constitute a
potential “civilian object” that enables the cyber operation to reach the
threshold of harm because the operation would constitute an infliction of
“destruction on . . . objects protected against direct attack.”127 As Schmitt
suggested, there are two instances in which data should be considered an
“object” under IHL. First, if the data is “directly transferable into tangible
122
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objects.”128 Banking data that represents data pertaining to actual physical
objects (money), if deleted or altered, would therefore constitute
destruction to physical objects. Second, data with intrinsic value, such as
digital art, should also be considered an “object.”129
While protecting digital art is important, the focus should be on
protecting data that is not necessarily directly transferable to physical
objects, but nevertheless constitutes an integral part of societal structure
and order. Examples include police records, maps, and academic research,
to name a few. These examples represent data that is not directly
transferable to physical objects, but is nonetheless essential for every
society in its day-to-day affairs. Moreover, it is immaterial whether data is
digital or physical, since in both cases its destruction would cause harm,
and claiming that only physical destruction counts for the purpose of DPH
is counterintuitive and detrimental to the protection of the civil society.
Although the DPH paradigm focuses on very physical aspects of
destruction, when it comes to cyberspace, it is time to appreciate the
importance and centrality of data and to protect it from exploitation.
3. Critical Infrastructure Disruption & Civilian Nuisance and
Inconvenience
Another problem arising from the threshold of harm requirement
is the relationship to harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure. While it
is clear that civilian harm (other than death, injury or destruction)
accompanied by adverse military effect will reach the threshold, it is
unclear whether harm to civilian life that results in major inconveniences,
or even terrorization of civilians,130 could cross the threshold alone.131
This question relates to “destruction” in the non-physical sense132 and
128
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highlights one of the shortcomings of the DPH framework: it lacks
adequate protections for civilians from hostilities carried out by other
civilians. There is a double standard when it comes to non-physical
destruction or harm. Such harm would reach the threshold if it adversely
affects military operations. However, if it only adversely affects civilian
wellbeing, the answer is unclear.
Two cyber-attacks illustrate this point. First, the cyber-attacks on
Estonia133 in 2007 that caused the large-scale disruption of services in
different areas, such as banking, administration, and media. Second, the
cyber-attacks on Georgia134 in the wake of the 2008 Russian Georgian
War that caused even less non-physical harm outside of the defacement of
certain websites, such as the Georgian President’s website. Neither attack
would reach the threshold of harm required by the DPH framework if it
was established that they occurred in an armed conflict context, but carried
out by civilians.135
Under this narrow interpretation, a cyber operation that targets a
civilian power plant will only reach the threshold of harm if it adversely
affects military operations or directly causes death, injury or (physical)
destruction. However, under a broader interpretation even cyber
operations that impose “mere harassment or inconvenience” to civilians
would reach the threshold and qualify as hostilities.136 The Interpretive
Guidance itself provides that “the interruption of electricity, water, or food
supplies . . . . would not, in the absence of adverse military effects, cause
the kind and degree of harm required to qualify as direct participation in
hostilities.”137 However, while the Interpretive Guidance threshold of
harm will not be crossed in instances of civilian harm, it is possible that
the Tallinn Manual interpretation will be applicable. This is the case if the
intent of the person carrying out the cyber operation was to cause death,
injury or destruction, but the cyber operation ended up only causing nonphysical civilian harm.
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However, many scholars believe the threshold of harm is “underinclusive” when it comes to possible harms to civilians.138 The result is
that “[c]yber warriors are free to engage in cyber operations that could
exact a significant toll on the civilian population of the enemy State
without risk of being targeted, a consequence seemingly at odds with the
goal of protecting civilians from the consequences of armed conflict.”139
Therefore, in order to meet the new threats posed by cyber operations, the
DPH framework must recognize new potential harms, especially when it
comes to civilians and civilian objects.
4. Cyber Espionage on Military Intelligence Targets
Cyber operations that aim to gather data and military intelligence
present another difficult issue under the DPH framework. Cyber espionage
operations cannot generally be considered to reach the threshold of harm,
as simply collecting intelligence does not directly cause physical damage,
bodily harm, or death, and it is unlikely on its own to affect military
operations or military capacity. However, these operations could be
considered as reaching the threshold of harm if they adversely affect the
military operations or capacity of the targeted party. Such a scenario is not
farfetched, as sensitive intelligence on upcoming military operations may
well thwart and prevent a military operation, thus adversely affecting it.
The Interpretive Guidance adopts an approach that distinguishes
two types of intelligence gathering. First, the Interpretive Guidance
clarifies that “individuals whose function is limited to the purchasing,
smuggling, manufacturing and maintaining of weapons and other
equipment outside specific military operations or to the collection of
intelligence other than of a tactical nature” would not be considered
DPH.140 This is a rational approach as these activities contribute to the
general war efforts, and the lack of operational-tactical value to the
intelligence gathering activity would not adversely affect the military
operations of the adversary. Second, even if the intelligence gathered is of
a tactical nature, the Interpretive Guidance requires that it constitute an
“integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that directly
causes such [above the threshold] harm.”141
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Interestingly, the Tallinn Manual provides that “[c]yber espionage
and other forms of information gathering directed at an adversary during
an armed conflict do not violate the law of armed conflict.”142 However,
the Manual later clarifies that in some instances, cyber espionage could
constitute direct participation in hostilities, although no examples besides
cyber espionage activities are given.143
Cyber espionage activities challenge both the threshold and
temporal questions discussed infra. First, the impact of cyber operations
that merely collect intelligence is not always visible or apparent, making
it difficult to respond to with real-time targeting.144 Second, while cyber
espionage activities might be detected while they are still ongoing, they
can also be detected after intelligence collecting has ceased and the
individual in question has stopped participating in the activity.145 To a
lesser degree, similar challenges accompany cyber operations that actually
produce physical effects that sometimes go undetected until well after the
operations are completed. This was the case in Iran when Stuxnet infected
its nuclear plants, causing massive damage to centrifuges.146
To overcome the challenges of cyber espionage carried out by
civilians, contextual analysis is required. First, the focus needs to be on
cyber operations collecting intelligence that is essential and integral to a
military operation or the military capacity of an adversary. Second, the
intelligence collected by the opposing party should be evaluated to
determine whether it is objectively likely to reach the threshold of harm in
a reasonable temporal proximity to the act of cyber espionage itself. Thus,
not every intelligence collection operation would qualify as DPH, as it
depends on whether such operation fulfills the threshold of harm
requirement.

would probably have to be regarded as directly participating in hostilities.” Id. at
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B. The Temporal Challenge
The temporal idea behind the DPH framework is that civilians are
targetable “for such time as they take direct part in hostilities.”147 This
means that if they cease to participate in hostilities, they are no longer
targetable with lethal force.148 The Interpretive Guidance adds that the
temporal scope includes “[m]easures preparatory to the execution of a
specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment
to and the return from the location of its execution. . . .”149 When it comes
to cyber operations, the equivalent of “preparatory measures” and
“deployment and return” is sometimes nonexistent, as cyber operations
can be carried out instantaneously without any preparation or travel to and
from the location of the attack. Consequently, there are two questions in
regards to the temporal aspect. First, at what point in time do the activities
undertaken by a civilian qualify as direct participation in hostilities?
Second, at what point in time and under what conditions does a civilian
cease being targetable under the DPH framework? The answer to both of
these questions is far from obvious.
In a meeting on “Direct Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law,” Nils Melzer, ICRC’s legal adviser,
summarized the positions of current experts on the temporal scope issue:
At one end of the spectrum were experts who preferred narrowly
defining temporal scope and favoured strictly limiting loss of
protection to the period where DPH is actually being carried out. At
the other end were experts who said that, once a person had
undertaken an act constituting DPH, that person must clearly express
a will to definitively disengage and offer assurances that he or she
will not resume hostilities in order to regain protection against direct
attack. However, opinions varied greatly and could not easily be
divided into two groups supporting distinct positions.150

In that meeting, opinions varied from a narrow scope of loss of
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in question, to a broader scope that legitimizes targeting of civilians as
long as the armed conflict takes place.151
The Interpretive Guidance adopted a somewhat more ambiguous
and flexible scope by providing that “civilians lose protection against
direct attack for the duration of each specific act amounting to direct
participation in hostilities . . . .”152
1. Beginning and Cessation of DPH Status
The Interpretive Guidance clarifies that “[m]easures preparatory
to the execution of a specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as
well as the deployment to and the return from the location of its execution,
constitute an integral part of that act.”153 In addition, the Interpretive
Guidance addresses cyber operations specifically, by providing that –
Where the execution of a hostile act does not require geographic
displacement, as may be the case with computer network attacks or
remote-controlled weapons systems, the duration of direct
participation in hostilities will be restricted to the immediate
execution of the act and preparatory measures forming an integral
part of that attack.154

The Tallinn Manual took a broader stance by including “actions
immediately preceding or subsequent to the qualifying act. For instance,
traveling to and from the location where a computer used to mount an
operation is based…” in the temporal scope of the DPH framework.155
The Law of War, on the other hand, is not decisive on the temporal
scope issue and focuses on the cessation rather than the beginning of the
act as constituting DPH, by providing that:
In the U.S. approach, civilians who have taken a direct part in
hostilities must not be made the object of attack after they have
permanently ceased their participation because there would be no
military necessity for attacking them. Persons who take a direct part
in hostilities, however, do not benefit from a “revolving door” of
protection. There may be difficult cases not clearly falling into either
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of these categories, and in such situations a case-by-case analysis of
the specific facts would be needed.156

The temporal aspect is exacerbated in cyberspace due to the
instantaneous nature of cyber operations through the initiation, effects
materialization, and termination of the cyber operation.157 In addition to
these difficulties, the effects of some cyber operations are only realized
long after the perpetrator regained his or her civilian status.158 Some argue
that the narrow opportunity to respond to cyber operations carried out by
civilians in an armed conflict is too restrictive and would de facto
eliminate the right to strike back.159 However, it is important to note that
the DPH framework is intended to provide a tool to stop ongoing hostile
acts, rather than punish the perpetrators ex post facto.160 The perpetrator
may still face criminal prosecution as a consequence of his or her
violations of international or domestic criminal law.161 The main
difficultly remains with the prolonged effects of cyber operations, such as
“logic bombs.”162 In this case, a major gap lies between civilians who
cease carrying out cyber operations and the effects of these cyber
operations still experienced by the victims. However, it is important to
distinguish between two continued effects of cyber operations. First, there
are cyber operations in which the attack code is actively running, causing
continued effects.163 In this case, the individual carrying out the cyber
156
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operation is targetable during the time in which the code is running, as
long as the DPH requirements are fulfilled.164 Second, there are cyber
operations that cause continued effects. Those effects are not due to the
ongoing cyber operation but instead to secondary and tertiary effects on
the target’s computer systems and networks. In this situation, the
individual would be targetable only during the duration of the cyber
operation.165
2. Concept of “Revolving Door”
While civilians who are members of non-state organized armed
groups (OAGs) and assume a continuous combat function are targetable
as long as they are members of that group,166 civilians who are not
members of OAGs are generally targetable at the time their hostile act
takes place. Civilians who directly participate in hostilities sometimes
engage in repeated hostile acts on different occasions. Such action gave
rise to the concept of a “revolving door,”167 referring to their statuses
constantly changing between civilians and civilians who utilize DPH.168
While the Interpretive Guidance limits the application of the DPH
framework to each hostile act,169 there was major disagreement among
experts as the concept of “revolving door” in the Tallinn Manual.170 The
Tallinn Manual posited that when an individual mounts repeated cyber
operations, it is unclear (the experts were split) whether each act should be
evaluated separately. Therefore, the duration of targetability is limited to
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that act, or whether targetability “continues throughout the period of
intermittent activity.”171
Conversely, the Law of War Manual is quite explicit on the issue,
stating that “[t]he law of war, as applied by the United States, gives no
‘revolving door’ protection; that is, the off-and-on protection in a case
where a civilian repeatedly forfeits and regains his or her protection from
being made the object of attack depending on whether or not the person is
taking a direct part in hostilities at that exact time.”172
Realizing that most cyber-attacks today are carried out by
organized groups is key to the assessment of the targetability of these
individuals in an armed conflict context. For example, in April 2007,
Estonia decided to relocate a memorial commemorating the Soviet
liberation of Estonia from the Nazis from a central location in its capital
to a less central area, which set off an intense period of riots and protests
among the Estonian Russian-speaking community.173 In the aftermath,
Estonia was attacked by a massive wave of cyber-attacks that targeted
mostly its commercial banking and media websites.174 Although the
cyber-attack did not occur in an armed conflict context, the cyber-attacks
were led by an organized group called “Nashi” (Russian for “Ours”),
which in the past conducted operations on Moscow’s behalf.175 This
demonstrates that a massive cyber-attack, such as the Estonian attack, is
often carried out by an organized group playing a repeat role in similar
operations. These repeated acts should then be analyzed cohesively,
transcending the evaluation of individual sporadic acts.
(a) Characterization as Organized Armed Group?
The gap within IHL with regard to OAGs is apparent when applied
to hacking groups. The broader question is whether a cyber operation is
carried out by an individual civilian, whose DPH status will be evaluated
individually, by civilians as part of a hacking group, who will be evaluated
as members of organized armed groups, or by civilians with continuous
combat function, who are targetable at all times due to their affiliation.
More specifically, two issues arise from this concept. First, whether
171
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“virtually” organized groups are “organized” and qualify as OAGs.176
Second, whether hacking groups, who reach the threshold of harm, are
“armed.”177
The Commentary to Additional Protocol I provides that “the term
‘organized’ is obviously rather flexible, as there are a large number of
degrees of organization.”178 It further provides that the fighting character
of a group is “collective,” meaning that it is “conducted under proper
control and according to rules,” rather than “individuals operating in
isolation with no corresponding preparation or training.”179 In that sense,
hacking groups can be acting under a direct command structure and
carrying out their cyber operations collectively by sharing intelligence and
hacking tools and by identifying exploitable vulnerabilities.180 Hacking
groups that do not have a clear command structure but operate for a
common cause are more difficult to analyze and should be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis. However, the assumption is that States will still deem
them to be organized armed groups.181
The requirement of “armed” is closely related to a collective of
individuals who can carry out “attacks” under IHL, meaning “acts of
violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defense.”182 The
Tallinn Manual defines cyber attacks as “cyber operation[s], whether
offensive or defensive, that [are] reasonably expected to cause injury or
death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.”183 The main issue
with the notion of “armed” is that not all hacking groups are causing the
required threshold of harm to be considered “armed” organized groups.
However, there is a clear distinction between harm in the context of
“armed,” which necessarily requires violent acts, and harm in the context
of DPH, which is a more lenient standard that can be satisfied by adverse
military effects, even in the absence of violent acts. Given that gap,
individuals who are members of hacking groups might be considered
DPH. However, these hacking groups will not be considered “organized
armed groups” since the threshold for “armed” was not reached. That
disparity challenges targeting decisions since each individual is evaluated
in isolation from the whole group in question. In this regard, the DPH
176
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framework is actually more permissive, and as the Israeli Supreme Court
put it in the Targeted Killings case, “it is possible to take part in hostilities
without using weapons at all.”184
Another major flaw in the context of OAGs is that the OAG is
required to “belong to a party to the conflict.”185 This requirement might
be fulfilled if the OAG is engaged in an armed conflict, whether
international or non-international. One example is the Islamic State. It is
engaged in an armed conflict against the United States while also carrying
out concurrent cyber operations in relation to that armed conflict.186
However, hacking groups that solely employ cyber operations are unlikely
to trigger a separate armed conflict,187 as the threshold for such armed
conflict would not be reached solely based on cyber operations.188 As the
ICRC stated, “whether CNA [computer network attacks] alone will ever
be seen as amounting to an armed conflict will probably be determined in
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a definite manner only through future state practice.”189 In that regard, the
Tallinn Manual clarifies that a non-international armed conflict using
cyber terms “exists whenever there is protracted armed violence, which
may include or be limited to cyber operations.”190 This introduces the
possibility that cyber operations alone could qualify as non-international
armed conflict if the operations reached “a minimum level of intensity”
and a “minimum degree of organization.”191 This restatement represents a
widely accepted definition, as stipulated by the International Criminal
Tribunal in the Former Yugoslavia during the Tadic judgment.192
The Interpretive Guidance provides that such groups, without
belonging to a party to the armed conflict, “cannot be regarded as members
of the armed forces of a party to the conflict” and are therefore considered
civilians.193 But the Guidance further provides that such groups “could
still be regarded as parties to a separate non-international armed conflict
provided that [their] violence reach[ed] the required threshold.”194
Consequently, unaffiliated hacking groups pose a great challenge to the
notion of OAGs given that they might be acting on their own behalf,
isolated from the armed conflict politics, and not reaching the threshold of
armed conflict.195 However, as noted before, the DPH paradigm might still
apply to these groups in relation to their cyber operation in an ongoing
armed conflict, even if such groups are not parties to the conflict. This is
because the DPH framework applies to civilians who directly participate
in hostilities, rather than existing parties to armed conflict.196
189
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Overall, when a civilian engages in cyber operations sporadically
and without a continuous pattern, he or she shall be protected after the
cyber operation has ceased. However, evidence that points towards
membership in hacking groups could cause a civilian to lose protection. In
the rare cases where a hacking group is considered an OAG, members who
carry out cyber operations on behalf of that OAG would not be protected
after the cyber operation has ceased unless they permanently become
unaffiliated with that OAG.

CONCLUSION
The emergence of cyber operations as an integral part of modern
armed conflicts introduces a myriad of challenges for legal experts and
policymakers given the conspicuous absence of consistent state practices
and the dearth of substantive norms needed to reform and ultimately
govern cyberspace conduct. However, there are some key considerations
that might assist in the norm formation process in relation to cyber
operations in armed conflicts.
First, the threshold of harm needs to be refined to encompass new
types of harms, which would trigger the forfeiture of civilian status. It must
encompass effects that, although inconvenient, will not be considered
direct participation in hostilities. For example, terrorizing civilians
through cyber operations, alteration of critical civilian data, and
incapacitating civilian services through cyber operations should be
considered sufficient harm to trigger the DPH framework. However,
effects and activities such as propaganda, commercial and non-tactical
espionage, free expression relating to the armed conflict, and online
advocacy, even if highly inconvenient, should not be considered DPH. The
applicability of the DPH framework to a civilian does not necessarily mean
that he will be targeted, but that the DPH framework will, in a way, assist
in creating binding norms for behavior in cyberspace, particularly
pertaining to civilians, in the context of an armed conflict.
Second, the temporal aspect of the DPH framework is another
major issue. Cyber operations might be ongoing, in which case the
perpetrators are targetable. However, operations are more commonly
instantaneous and distant. The DPH framework was intended mainly to
address “hot battlefield” issues, such as civilians physically participating
in hostilities with geographical and temporal proximity to the battlefield.
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 14, at 26 (“All persons who are neither
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict nor participants in a levée
en masse are civilians and, therefore, entitled to protection against direct attack
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”).
196
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We are witnessing the civilianization of the cyber-battlefield,197 that is,
cyberspace is becoming a “civilian-occupied battlespace.”198 States, on the
other hand, find it increasingly challenging to retain their monopoly over
cyber-force, given the ease of use and accessibility of computer systems
for civilians.199 Two phenomena accompany that assertion. First, civilians
will become more involved in cyber operations during armed conflicts.
Second, these civilians will be increasingly classified based on their status,
either as civilians with continuous combat functions or contractors who
participate in combat.200
At this point, only State practice, actual materialization of these
predictions, and more serious and nuanced harms due to cyber operations
can point towards the expected changes in the temporal concept as it
relates to the DPH framework. The Interpretive Guidance, Tallinn Manual,
and U.S. Law of War Manual’s uses of ambiguous and broad terms and
concepts to address cyber warfare are inadequate, and reveal that even the
most advanced instruments and organizations cannot solve these threats in
one fell swoop. Thus, more thought and normative development,
especially for international rules of conduct in cyberspace, are desperately
needed.
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See Andreas Wenger & Simon J.A. Mason, The Civilianization of Armed
Conflict: Trends and Implications, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Dec. 31,
2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-wenger-mason.pdf.
198
Karine Bannelier-Christakis, Is The Principle of Distinction Still Relevant in
Cyberwarfare?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
CYBERSPACE 343, 358 (Tsagourias & Buchan eds., 2015).
199
See generally Susan W. Brenner with Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in
Cyberwarfare: Conscripts, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1011 (2010).
200
E.L. Gaston, Note, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security
Industry and Its Implications for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement,
49 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 221, 225 (2008) (explaining that “private military firms . . .
offer combat capabilities, tactical analysis, and other direct military support”).

